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Abstract 
 
In the recent years, Chinese energy firms have accumulated significant free cash flows due to 
higher energy prices and government subsidies and also have invested heavily. An important 
empirical question is whether the Chinese energy firms tend to misallocate resources due to 
growing free cash flows. In this paper, we test whether they make some sub-optimal 
investment decisions following the well-established free cash flow problem in the finance 
literature, originally identified by Jensen (1986) for the US oil sector. Using a dynamic panel 
model for the period 2001-2012 for the Chinese energy-related public listed firms, we find 
evidence supporting the free cash flow hypothesis, suggesting over-investment problems in 
the Chinese energy sector. In addition, we observe that firm size and corporate governance 
structure are important determinants of the Chinese energy firms’ investment decisions.  
 
 
 
JEL: G31 G32 Q4 
Keyword: Free cash flow, Energy firms, Fundamental Q, Dynamic Panel Data 
Model, Panel VAR 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Higher energy prices in the new century, especially in oil prices, have created 
significant opportunities and challenges in the world economy, triggering substantial 
research on its consequences in the literature.1 The Brent oil price, which was $23.64 
                                                             
1
 Higher energy prices have affected many key macroeconomic variables in China and other emerging markets as 
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per barrel in January 2000, rose to $112.51 in January 2012. Such radical changes in 
crude oil prices over time have generated significant free cash flows in the oil industry, 
which, among others, are related to financial stress (Nazlioglu, Soytas and Gupta, 
2015) and risk-spillovers from energy companies to the other commodities (Soytas 
and Oran, 2011; Gormus, Soytas and Diltz, 2014). 
 
The Chinese energy sector has also been affected by changes in oil prices. Figure 1 
provides information about the impact of the growing oil prices on the cash flows of 
China’s energy related firms compares them with the other firms.2 The left panel of 
Figure 1 shows the cash flows in levels. On average, the cash flow of the energy firms 
is larger than that of the firms in other industries by as much as six times. The 
difference has been more significant after the 2008 financial crisis when oil prices 
rebounded quickly after a significant drop during the crisis. The right panel of Figure 
1 exhibits the percentage of cash flows for energy firms and also the share of such 
firms in overall firms (excluding financial firms) listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges. The percentage of cash flows in energy firms relative to all firms is 
well above 15% and reached around 25% in the period 2009–2012. In addition, the 
Chinese energy firms have been actively involved in exploration and development 
(E&D) activities and spent heavily on investments around the world. According to the 
Heritage Foundation, there has been around $144 billion direct investment between 
2005 and 2011 (Tan, 2013) from China to the rest of the world in the energy/resource 
sector, which accounts for about 47% of all outward direct investment of China.  
 
The general picture observed in the Chinese energy sector in the recent years is 
similar to what Jensen (1986) illustrated about the US oil industry during the 1980s. 
As Jensen (1986, p. 326) stated: “the 1984 cash flows of the ten largest oil companies 
were $48.5 billion, 28 percent of the total cash flows of the top 200 firms in Dun’s 
Business Month survey.” The managers of these firms did not pay dividends to the 
shareholders, but they instead spent heavily on E&D and diversification programs 
outside of the oil industry. McConnell and Muscarella (1986) find that these 
expenditures reduced those firms’ stock prices and the recovery rate in these 
investments ranged from 60 to 90 percent. Similar concerns have been raised in the 
literature about the Chinese firms. For example, Wei et al. (2004), point out that the 
Chinese firms are reluctant to pay dividends. Hofman and Kuijs (2006) suggest that 
the high savings of domestic enterprises play an important role in China’s fast 
economic growth.3 Such high savings, in part, are mainly due to ‘windfall’ profits in 
the state owned sector, especially in the energy and resource related industries. Low 
                                                                                                                                                                              
well, causing wealth effects due to changes in share prices (Balcilar, Gupta, and Miller, 2015; Lin, Fang and Cheng, 
2014; Nikkinen, Saleem, Martikainen and Omran, 2014; Sukcharoen, Zohrabyan, Leatham and Wu, 2014 ), 
exchange rates (Sari, Hammoudeh and Soytas, 2010; Basher, Haug and Sadorsky, 2012; Turhan, Hacihasanoglu 
and Soytas, 2015) and the  inflation rate (Tang, Wang and Wang, 2014; Zhao, Zhang, Wang and Xu, 2015). 
2
 The energy firms in our study include the traditional energy industry (i.e. electricity, oil, coal and gas) and the 
non-traditional sector plus energy related firms (i.e. new energy firms and machinery manufacturing firms). More 
details on the selection of energy firms are discussed in the data section. 
3
 For other studies linking energy issues to economic growth, see, among others, Guan, Zhou and Zhang, (2015), 
Jalil and Feridun (2014), and Yuan, Xu and Zhang, (2015). 
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dividend payments by firms over time may suggest agency problems.4  
 
An important question we address in this paper is therefore whether the investments 
by the Chinese energy related firms increase the value these firms. Do managers of 
these firms have agency problems, as Jensen (1986) suggested, and hence act at the 
expense of their shareholders? Finding out an answer to this question has important 
policy implications. The empirical methodology of testing this question is well 
established in the main stream finance literature. Jensen (1986) proposed the free cash 
flow (FCF) hypothesis following the US case. He defines the FCF as the excess cash 
flow over what is required to fund all projects with a net positive present value (NPV). 
According to the FCF hypothesis, firms with free cash flows tend to face higher 
agency costs due to conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. Firm 
managers have strong incentives to invest rather than distribute the FCF as dividends 
despite poor investment opportunities (represented by a negative NPV). Since, in this 
case, the return on investment is lower than the cost of capital, investments with 
negative NPVs hurt the shareholders, causing the FCF problem. Following this logic, 
Lang and Litzenerger (1989) introduce an interaction term of cash flow and a proxy of 
future investment opportunities to test for the FCF problem. Cash flows can increase 
investment, but observing higher investment volumes during times of poor future 
opportunities indicates agency problem.  
 
The key issue is how to specify future investment opportunities. Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) initially suggest Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of the 
firm’s assets to their replacement cost, to distinguish good investment opportunities 
from bad ones. However, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) criticize that the Tobin’s 
Q has low explanatory power and is an insufficient measure of investment 
opportunities. We therefore use the fundamental Q proposed by Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995) in our empirical analysis. Furthermore, the FCF problem may be 
sensitive to a set of variables such as the corporate governance (i.e. ownership 
structure), size, and financial constraints. We also control for these factors in our 
empirical analysis when testing the FCF hypothesis. The results show that these 
factors indeed play an important role in testing in the FCF hypothesis for Chinese 
firms. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the growing 
literature on testing the FCF hypothesis and related studies on the energy sector. 
Section 3 explains the method of estimating the fundamental Q and testing the FCF 
hypothesis. Section 4 describes the data while Section 5 reports the empirical results. 
The last section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
                                                             
4
 However, Bayoumi et al. (2010) challenge this view. Based on a firm-level dataset, they report no significant 
difference between the corporate saving rate in China and the rest of the world. 
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Since Jensen’s (1988) study on the free cash flow problem, there have been numerous 
studies in the finance literature trying to test this hypothesis. Initial studies including 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and Lang et al. (1991) use Tobin’s Q to measure 
investment opportunities. Vogt (1994) suggests that both the free cash flow and the 
pecking order hypotheses are potential explanations for the investment/cash flow 
relationship. Perfect (1995) finds evidence for the FCF using the current measure of Q, 
but not for that of the long-run Q (average Q). Since then, many followers have 
studied this issue using data from different countries (e.g., Pawlina and Renneboog, 
2005 and Wei and Zhang, 2008). 
 
It is important to identify good investment opportunities when testing the FCF 
problems. The good opportunities are often refer to projects with a positive NPV. It is 
often said that a higher Tobin’s Q indicates good opportunities and investment is 
supposed to be more productive, thus increasing the firm’s market value. For example, 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) take Tobin Q’s being unity as the threshold to test 
whether a firm overinvests (where Q is less than one), which is consistent with the 
FCF theory. Their empirical results are generally supportive of the FCF hypothesis. 
Furthermore, Lang et al. (1991) also use Tobin’s Q as the proxy of investment 
opportunities and tested the FCF hypothesis in the case of tender offers. Their results 
are also supportive of the FCF hypothesis. 
 
Despite the popularity of Tobin’s Q, many researchers have found poor explanatory 
power in their empirical studies (see, among others, Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992). 
The feasibility of using Tobin’s Q is criticized by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), 
however. They point out that the low explanatory power of Tobin Q and implausibly 
high estimates of the adjustment cost parameters reported in previous studies make 
Tobin Q insufficient to control for investment opportunities. A new measure is then 
introduced by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) to estimate Q from firm level 
fundamentals, and is referred to it as the ‘fundamental’ Q. This alternative measure of 
Q not only takes the current proxy for investment into account, but also employs a 
forecasting procedure to be more explicitly allowing for future investment 
opportunities.  
 
Although the issue of FCF problem was initially arisen from the oil industry and 
energy-related firms, empirical studies on this particular industry are relatively less 
developed. Early studies such as Griffin (1988) extends the general finance literature 
to oil industry firms and finds supporting evidence of FCF and proves that agency 
problems exist in the US energy industry. Lamont (1997) looks at the firms’ reactions 
to oil price shocks and finds that oil firms’ reactions are consistent with the agency 
cost hypothesis as they fail to react optimally to lower oil prices. The common 
features of these existing studies on developed countries are that they use Tobin’s Q 
and most of them support the existence of agency problems in the energy industry.   
 
Entering the new century, China has facing ever-increasing pressure of energy 
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demand. To secure supply of energy for maintaining a sustainable and stable 
economic growth, China has invested heavily both domestically and across the world. 
Tan (2013) surveys the status of China’s overseas investment in the energy and 
resource sectors. The general message is that investment from the energy and resource 
sector account for a significant portion of total investment from China to the rest of 
the world, in terms of both scale and speed of growth.5 Given the size and importance 
of this investment, it is therefore not only crucial for private investors, but also for the 
government to evaluate the efficiency of energy investment. Hence, studying the 
investment behavior of Chinese energy firms is important to understand the 
fundamental incentives of the managers of these firms. Although there are some 
empirical studies on the FCF problems in China (e.g., Chen et al., 2001, Huang et al., 
2011), there are not many studies focusing on China’s energy firms. Recently, 
renewable energy sector in China has experienced a remarkable speed of growth, 
which essentially triggers some heated debate about whether these investments have 
been rational. For example, Zhang et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence of 
overinvestment in the renewable energy firms. Their methodology is essentially the 
same as that used in the main stream finance literature. There is clearly a gap in the 
existing literature that combines the detailed exploration of FCF problem in the 
energy related firms in China with an appropriate measure of future investment 
opportunities.  
 
Following recent studies, this paper also incorporates several standard measures of 
corporate governance factor into the test of FCF problem. For example, Gugler et al. 
(2013) study the determinants of investment in the electricity market and find 
ownership unbundling, price, and regulation affect investment decisions. Chen et al. 
(2013), among others, show a significant role of corporate governance factor in firms’ 
investment decision, which is especially relevant for the firms in China.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
The section briefly explains the methodology used in the empirical parts. In particular, 
we first discuss how to estimate the fundamental Q, which replaces Tobin’s Q, and 
then describe a dynamic investment model used to test for the FCF hypothesis. 
3.1 Estimating Fundamental Q model 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) construct an alternative proxy for measuring future 
investment opportunities, namely, the ‘fundamental’ Q, using a panel VAR approach. 
Let EQ|Ω  represents the shadow price of capital or marginal Q, where Ωit is the 
information set at time t. Marginal Q equals to the discounted stream of future 
marginal profitability of capital, which is given by ∑ λ Eπ|Ω  , where λ is 
the discount factor and π represents profit of firm i at time t+s.  
                                                             
5
 For a recent assessment of China’s energy policy and developments, see Li and Du (2013), Kalyuzhnova and 
Lee (2014), Wang, Li and Wu (2014), Xu, Fan and Yu (2014), and Lin and Li (2015). 
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Considering a vector X containing observed fundamentals (a subset of the information 
set), a first order panel VAR model can be written as: 
 
X = AX,	 + f + d + u                                       (1) 
 
Equation 1 allows us to control for firm-specific effects through fi and a vector of 
common aggregate shocks over time to all firms dt . uit represents panel residuals and 
are assumed to be orthogonal to the lags of Xit . Forward substitute of the model in 
Equation 1 and applying the law of iterated expectations produces the following 
expression: 
 
EX,
|Ω  = AX +  Γ	f +  Γd                                  (2) 
 
where Γs are complicated functions of the parameter f, A and dt. Suppose π is the 
jth element of Xit , then we can write πit = C’Xit , where C is a vector of zeros with one 
in the jth row and it is conformable to Xit. The ‘fundamental’ Q can then be written as: 
 
FQ = EQ|Ω  = ∑ λ ECX,|Ω  = ∑ λ ECAX|X               
= C′ ∑ (λA)X = C′(I − λA)	X                                    (3) 
 
where I is the identity matrix and A is estimated in Equation (3).  
 
3.2 The investment model  
In order to test the FCF hypothesis, we follow the initial work by Fazzaki et al. (1988) 
and write our model as follows: 
 
(I/K) = β + β	Q + β(CF/K) + ω + τ + ε                         (4) 
 
where I/K stands for investment divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock and 
CF/K stands for the cash flow scaled by the same capital stock. Q is the proxy for 
investment opportunities as defined above. This model also allows for the firm- 
specific and time-specific fixed effects through ωi and τt, respectively. 
 
Lang et al. (1991) propose to use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities 
and set unit value as a threshold to test for the FCF hypothesis. For firms with high 
Tobin’s Q (TQ > 1), they are considered as having good investment opportunities. 
After adding more control variables denoted by Z, they set up the following empirical 
model: 
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(I/K) = β + β	TQ + β(CF/K) + β 	





× TQ < 1 + δZ + π + τ +
ε                                                         (5) 
 
where I(·) is a function that equals unit when the statement in the brackets is true and 
zero otherwise. TQ < 1 is a dummy variable equals 1 if Tobin’s Q less than 1, 
which is used to represent poor investment opportunities (Lang et al., 1991).The key 
indicator here is β3. If it is positive, it means that firms with lower investment 
opportunities invest their cash flows supporting the FCF hypothesis.  
 
In our analysis, we follow the literature and include (I/K)t-1, (I/K),	  and 
(D/K),	
 in all our estimated regressions to control for non-modeled firm 
characteristics, adjustment cost and the probability of bankruptcy. We also replace the 
Tobin’s Q with the fundamental Q to represent future investment opportunities. Of 
course, the threshold value is not unity in this case.6 Since the models include lagged 
dependent variables, we employ the dynamic panel data model (DPD) estimation 
technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and estimated through the system GMM method. 
 
4. Data description 
Energy related firms listed in the Chinese stock market cover electricity, coal, oil and 
gas, the new energy sector, and other related industries. The choice of these firms is 
based on the Global Industrial Classification Standard (GICS) four digit code (1010). 
In order to further confirm the choice of our sample companies and avoid missing any 
related information, we also utilize a couple of classifications from two main Chinese 
financial information websites.7 After adding this information and upon further 
scrutiny, our sample includes 169 energy-related firms. Broadstock et al. (2012) also 
use a similar methodology in selecting number of firms in their sample. 
 
The information about the financial statements and shareholding structures of the 
firms are collected from the RESSET database. Our sample is annual and covers the 
period from 2001 to 2012. Given that a balanced panel is needed for estimating the 
fundamental Q, we exclude data prior to 2001 as doing so would significantly reduce 
the number of firms in the sample. After controlling for missing data and outliers 
(winsorizing the top and bottom 1% for cash flow), the estimated balanced panel 
includes 99 firms. 
 
Considering that the calculation of fundamental Q first requires us to run a panel VAR 
model and the estimated model is used for forecasting, we adopt a rolling windows 
                                                             
6
 Please refer to section 5 for more details how we define good investment opportunities using fundamental Q. 
7
 www.jrj.com.cn and Sina Finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn) 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
method to compute the fundamental Q. To do so, we need to drop the first four years 
for the second step regression analysis (as the panel VAR model requires a one-year 
lag). In general, the total number of observations in our sample set is 1188 and the 
effective sample size for estimating the investment model are 792 (from 2005 to 
2012). 
 
The model variables and their sample means are defined in Table 1. We observe that 
the full sample mean (the sample includes all available data, including those used in 
the panel VAR model) is very close to the effective sample mean (the sample used in 
the investment model estimation) in Table 1, suggesting that the results are robust to 
the choice of the sample period.  
 
Following Bond and Meghir (1994), the cash flow variable is calculated by adding up 
operating profits before tax, interest and dividend and fixed asset depreciation. Debt is 
the total liabilities, which include both short-term and long-term loans. These two 
variables, as well as investment, sales, profit are scaled by the beginning period book 
value of fixed assets (adjusted for depreciation).  
 
The size and ownership structure variables are shown to affect firm performance and 
firms’ financial constraints, which, in turn, affect investment decisions. For example, 
Chow and Fung (2000) show that the size variable matters in Chinese manufacturing 
firms. Xu and Wang (1999), Qi et al. (2000), Sun et al. (2002), and Poncet et al. (2010) 
report that state ownership affects firm performance and financial constraints of the 
firms. In order to further investigate the influence of corporate ownership on 
investment decisions, the full sample is divided according to the size of the firms as 
follows: State ownership shares, institutional shares, and management shares.  
 
The average values of these variables for the sub-samples, which are reported in Table 
2, show some noticeable differences. When we consider the key variables such as 
investment and different measures of Q, we observe that small energy firms tend to 
have lower level of investment but better investment opportunities (both in terms of 
TQ and FQ). Low state share firms tend to investment more and have better 
investment opportunities. The mean values of Tobin’s Q and Fundamental Q are not 
always consistent. For example, firms with high management holdings tend to have 
significantly higher fundamental Q but this does not hold in case of Tobin’s Q. In 
general, the simple descriptive statistics provide some interesting preliminary 
information to further proceed to the empirical analysis. 
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 is expected to have a significant impact on 
firm investment and output around the world. Inevitably, the firms in China were also 
affected (see, among others, Bo, Driver and Lin, 2014; Wan and Jin, 2014). Figure 1 
shows the cash flow differences before and after the GFC for energy related firms in 
China. It is therefore important to control for the potential influence of the crisis on 
investment decisions in the empirical analysis. To do so, a GFC dummy variable is 
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constructed, which equals unity in 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. 
 
5. Empirical results 
In this section we report the empirical results based on the investment model and 
fundamental Q summarized in Section 3. Both the full- and sub-sample results based 
on firm size and various ownership structure factors are estimated. We first discuss 
the baseline investment model results and then, following Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989), we discuss the FCF hypothesis results under different model settings. 
 
5.1 Full sample regression results 
We first discuss the differences in results regarding the three alternative measures of 
future investment opportunities, namely, the sales ratio, Tobin’s Q, and the 
fundamental Q. Table 3 reports the basic investment model regression results. Overall, 
seven models are considered. Model (1) is the benchmark model without considering 
future investment opportunities. The reported results are consistent with economic 
theory and existing literature on investment-cash flow sensitivity. Higher levels of 
cash flow boost investment, and a momentum effect exists (positive first order 
autocorrelation). The coefficients on the squared investment are all negative, 
reflecting the possible existence of adjustment cost (the initial model in Equation 5 
assumes no adjustment cost). The results are robust and consistent across all seven 
specifications. 
 
Financial difficulty or the possibility of bankruptcy reduces investment, so that the 
coefficient on the debt to capital ratio is significant and negative. This effect is 
economically weaker (model 2f) or insignificant (models 3f and 4f) when the GFC 
dummy is included, however, suggesting that the debt to capital ratio is more 
important for investment decisions during financial crises. In other words, the results 
suggest that the financial distress faced by the energy firms may not necessarily the 
biggest problem, rather it is the GFC effects. When the general investment 
environment becomes poor during a financial crisis, firms reduce investment. 
 
Regarding the three proxies used as the measure of future investment opportunities, 
the results for Model 2 and 3 in Table 3 show both the lagged sales and Tobin’s Q 
generate a negative impact on firm’s investment, whereas the fundamental Q has a 
positive impact. The results for the sales ratio and Tobin’s Q are counterintuitive and 
may be driven by a significant correlation between sales and cash flows and/or not 
including the crisis dummy in regressions. Indeed, the negative effect on Tobin’s Q 
becomes marginally significant after the GFC is considered. Perhaps a better 
explanation for the counterintuitive results follows the evidence in the literature that 
the fundamental Q, as a forward looking measure, is likely to be a better measure of 
future investment opportunities than either the sales ratio or Tobin’s Q. Given the 
criticisms of Tobin’s Q in the literature, our empirical evidence here indicates that it 
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can produce incorrect conclusions about FCF problems in the case of Chinese data. In 
the rest of the paper we therefore report the results using only the fundamental Q as a 
proxy for future investment opportunities.  
 
Table 4 and 5 report the empirical results of testing the FCF hypothesis that follows 
the basic strategy of Lang and Litzenberger (1989). To do so, we add interaction 
terms consisting of cash flows and investment opportunities (i.e. CF/K*I(.)). Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) simply use the value of unity for Tobin’s Q as a threshold to 
distinguish between good or bad investment opportunities. Setting up thresholds for 
the fundamental Q, however, is less obvious. To check for the robustness of the 
findings, we use six methods (discussed below) to separate good and bad investment 
opportunities in Table 4 and Table 5. The results are generally consistent.  
 
In Table 4, four threshold values are used to distinguish between good and bad 
investment opportunities. The first set of models (Models from 5 to 6f) use zero as the 
threshold. The only difference between NFQ4 and NFQ is that the former considers 
an investment as a poor opportunity if the firm has negative ‘fundamental’ Q for at 
least four years within the effective sample period (2005–2012), while the latter looks 
only at the average. We also use Tobin’s Q (value of unity) as the benchmark and find 
that 12% of the observations are lower than unity. Thus a dummy variable is 
constructed, I(FQ12), which equals zero if the fundamental Q is above the 12% 
threshold, or unity otherwise. Additionally, a 30% threshold is used with the same 
logic to construct a dummy I(FQ30) as a poor investment opportunity indicator. The 
coefficients are positively significant despite the different thresholds. The message 
here is clear: firms with poor investment opportunities tend to overinvest. According 
to the FCF hypothesis, this investment generates less benefits for the shareholders but 
better satisfy the management incentives. Thus, the results show that energy firms in 
China have a clear FCF problem and tend to invest in less profitable projects. 
 
A further robustness check reported in Table 5, which separates the fundamental Q 
into three evenly divided groups (FQ1, FQ2 and FQ3), further confirms our results in 
Table 4. The coefficients on the interaction terms (CF/K*FQ1) of the lowest 
investment opportunities group (smallest fundamental Q) are positive and significant, 
indicating that those firms with positive cash flows but poor investment opportunities 
tend to invest, suggesting evidence of overinvestment problem. This result remains 
robust even if we consider only those firms with positive cash flows (set to zero if 
negative). The results for all other control variables in Table 4 and 5 stay qualitatively 
the same as the previous baseline regression results reported in Table 3 and therefore 
we do not discuss them any further.  
 
5.2  Impact of Size and Ownership on Investment  
The existing literature shows that the ownership structure matters for firms’ 
investment decisions. In China, large firms and those firms under significant state 
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control are less likely to be subject to major financial constraints while firms with a 
lower level of state control are more likely to be constrained financially. 
Consequently, the investment decisions of the firms are expected to be sensitive to the 
firm size and their ownership structure. We now investigate how these factors affect 
the results of the FCF test. 
 
In this section, we consider four criteria to divide the firms into several groups: size, 
state share of holdings, manager share of holdings, and institutional share of holdings. 
Table 6 reports the results of the size groups and ownership groups I (level of state 
share holdings). Most of the coefficients in the regression models stay the same as 
before. However, the FCF problem becomes more significant for the small firms but 
insignificant for the large firms. We have to keep in mind that the small firms in or 
sample on average have relatively better investment opportunities (see Table 2). But 
when we investigate this issue deeper, the positive coefficient on the interaction term 
of CF/K and FQ1 (CF/K*FQ1) reported for the small firms suggests that these firms 
tend to invest when facing poor investment opportunities. Larger firms, on the other 
hand, show no clear tendency to have overinvestment problems since only the 
coefficient for the interaction term of CF/K and FQ3 (good investment group) is 
significant. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that large Chinese firms invest when investment 
opportunities are good and are less affected by financial difficulties (as indicated by 
the positive but insignificant debt ratio effects). Smaller firms, on the contrary, tend to 
overinvest even when they face poor investment opportunities and are much more 
concerned with the possibility of bankruptcy (as shown by the significant negative 
debt ratio effects). When we look at the state ownership results, the result remains the 
same. In the energy related firms, large firms are associated with higher state 
ownership, and thus they are less likely to suffer from financial constraints and less 
concerned with bankruptcy (‘too big to fail’). 
 
The FCF problem is mainly due to conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. In this sense, allowing managers to hold stakes in their own firms can 
potentially alleviate the agency problem. Thus, we would expect to see less of an FCF 
problem in firms with higher manager shareholdings. This hypothesis is confirmed in 
Table 7 where models from 15 to 16a are employed to capture manager shareholdings. 
Other things being equal, low manager shareholding firms have stronger FCF 
problems. The coefficient of (CF/K) ⇑FQ1 for low MANHLD firms is significant and 
positive, whereas it is insignificant for the high MANHLD firms. It is also interesting 
to note that the investment model differs considerably for firms with high manager 
shareholdings. 
 
The results for institutional shareholding are reported in models from 17 to 18a in 
Table 7. Institutional shareholders normally have more power than private 
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shareholders. Thus we would expect that higher institutional shareholdings would be 
associated with better protection of shareholders’ interests. However, the results show 
that higher institutional shareholdings tend to make the firms suffer more from the 
FCF problem. One explanation for this counterintuitive finding could be related to 
state ownership. Firms with high institutional shareholdings tend to have less state 
ownership (the correlation is 0.89 in our sample). According to the results of models 
13 to 14a, low state-share ownership firms are more likely to have an FCF problem. 
In this sense, at least for the energy related firms in China, the state ownership 
dominates the institutional share holdings. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The rising energy prices in the new century have helped energy related firms in China 
accumulate significant free cash flows and investment by these firms has grown 
dramatically both domestically and internationally (Tan, 2013). Whether this 
investment increases firm value to the benefit of shareholders, or just reflects the 
managers’ interest in the ‘empire building’ is subject to empirical investigation and 
has important policy implications for regulators pursuing efficiency. This paper 
follows the standard finance literature to study the agency problems and tests the FCF 
hypothesis for energy firms in China. Our main contributions include using a better 
proxy, namely the fundamental Q, testing the FCF hypothesis in alternative model 
settings, and taking into consideration of firm characteristics, especially their 
ownership structure and governance factors. 
 
Our empirical results support the FCF hypothesis in the case of Chinese energy- 
related firms. We find that these firms tend to overinvest even when further 
investment opportunities become poor. The results are robust to different 
specifications of thresholds and consistent with economic theory. Investment tends to 
have a ‘momentum’ effect (positive autocorrelation) and there are also adjustment 
costs. The 2008 crisis has a clear role in reducing firm investment, but the same holds 
for the debt-capital ratio. Since the latter both represent financial difficulties, it is 
generally consistent that firms with financial difficulties are inclined not to invest. 
 
The size of the firms, and their degrees of state ownership and levels of managerial 
and institutional share holdings are also considered. The larger the firm, the less likely 
it will be affected by the FCF problems, which indicates that more regulatory efforts 
should be made and the focus should be on the relatively smaller firms. Our results 
also show that the state ownership does not necessarily mean less efficiency, since 
firms with more state ownership are less likely to suffer from the FCF problem, 
whereas those firms with lower state shares tend to overinvest. There are intensive 
regulations and rules guiding investment in the energy and resource sectors, mainly 
covering the state owned firms (Tan, 2013). In this sense, the results reported in this 
paper may indicate that there are insufficient regulatory measures for those firms with 
less state shareholdings.  
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As managerial shareholding is found to be helpful in alleviating the agency problem, 
one way of solving the FCF problem may be allowing managers to hold stakes in their 
own firms. On the other hand, contrary to our intuition, our results indicate that higher 
institutional shareholdings tend to increase the FCF problem. This may be due to the 
fact that firms with high shares of institutional holdings are often the firms with lower 
levels of state ownership.  
 
Overall, like the US oil sector, our empirical evidence supports the FCF hypothesis in 
the energy related firms in China, and finds evidence that firm size, ownership 
structure, and governance are important factors for understanding the agency problem 
in China’s energy firms. Further evidence from other countries and episodes would be 
interesting to see whether other emerging economies like China suffer from the FCF 
problems. 
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Table 1. Variable definition and sample means 
Variables 
Full sample mean Effective sample mean 
Definition 
(2001-2012) (2005-2012) 
I/K 0.383 0.373 Investment expenditure ratio   
CF/K 0.63 0.527 Cash flow capital ratio  
TQ 1.443 1.511 Market value/Asset replacement cost 
FQ 0.053 0.0533 Fundamental Q 
S/K 2.739 2.836 Total sales capital ratio 
P/K 0.181 0.159 Operating profit capital ratio 
D/K 0.867 0.876 Debt capital ratio 
Size 21.97 22.25 Log of total assets at the beginning of the year  
State 26 24.16 Percentage of State share holdings 
INSHLD 17.66 19.83 Percentage of Institution share holdings 
MANHLD 0.025 0.014 Percentage of Manager share holdings) 
Note: for all the ratios, K is the beginning of the year book value of fixed assets minus 
depreciation. Cash flow is defined as the depreciation of fixed assets plus operating profit before 
tax, interest and dividends. Effective sample excludes the first four years used to estimate the 
Panel VAR model.   
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Table 2. Average values for sub-samples 
Variables 
Size State Share MANHLD INSHLD 
Small Large Low High Low High Low High 
I/K 0.32 0.428 0.423 0.323 0.443 0.302 0.336 0.412 
CF/K 0.604 0.448 0.622 0.43 0.683 0.367 0.451 0.604 
TQ 1.777 1.239 1.64 1.379 1.531 1.49 1.411 1.613 
FQ 0.119 0.0695 0.153 0.0445 0.0275 0.154 0.0483 0.0727 
S/K 3.311 2.352 2.668 3.008 3.292 2.372 2.594 3.084 
P/K 0.119 0.198 0.175 0.142 0.166 0.151 0.183 0.133 
D/K 0.904 0.848 1.065 0.683 0.953 0.797 0.775 0.979 
Size 21.3 23.21 21.99 22.51 22.3 22.19 22.27 22.22 
State 21.29 27.09 12 36.57 28.69 19.54 21.53 26.85 
INSHLD 18.6 21.1 17.4 22.3 20.2 19.5 9.02 30.9 
MANHLD 0.0135 0.0148 0.0258 0.0023 0.0001 0.0285 0.0198 0.0085 
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Table 3: The basic investment model. This table reports system-GMM estimates of 
the investment model (Equation 5) for the sample of 99 firms from 2005 to 2012. For 
all models, the dependent variable is investment ratio (I/K). CF/K stands for Cash 
flow ratio. Investment is equal to cash outflow for the purchase of new fixed assets 
and other long-term assets as shown in cash flow statement, cash flow is the sum of 
depreciation of fixed assets plus operating profit, K is the net value of fixed assets at 
the beginning of the year. Equation (5) is unfermented with the lagged investment 
((I/K)
 t − 1 ), squared of lagged investment ((I/K) t − 12 ), the squared lagged debt term, 
(D/K) 2 , and the natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning year (Size). Model 
1 reports the results of baseline model. Model 2 to 4 control for the investment 
opportunities through sales ratio ((S/K)
 t − 1 ), Tobin’s Q (TQ) and the ‘fundamental’ Q 
(FQ). The impacts of 2008 GFC are considered in model 2f to 4f with similar settings 
as model 2 to 4. GFCdum. stands for the financial crisis dummy, which equals to 1 in 
the year of 2008, 2009, and zero otherwise. The lags of (I/K)	, (I/K)	 , (S/K)t-3 
and (P/K)t-3 are instruments in the system GMM estimation. Sargan test is employed 
to verify the null hypothesis of joint validity of instruments used in system-GMM, 
Autocorrelation tests are also used to determine the proper number of lags taking for 
the instrument variables. These testing results are not reported but available upon 
request. Standard errors are in brackets and we use * for 10% level of significance and 
** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2f) (3f) (4f) 
  CF SALE Tobin's Q FQ SALE Tobin's Q FQ 
(I/K)t-1 1.3839*** 1.6532*** 1.4211*** 1.4391*** 1.5318*** 1.3524*** 1.3226*** 
 
(0.3745) (0.3442) (0.3689) (0.3768) (0.3561) (0.3502) (0.3830) 
(I/K)t-1
2
 -0.0658*** -0.0762*** -0.0663*** -0.0638*** -0.0761*** -0.0683*** -0.0608** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0169) (0.0182) (0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0189) (0.0242) 
CF/K 1.2368*** 1.2383*** 1.1964*** 0.9108*** 1.4771*** 1.4799*** 1.1370*** 
 
(0.3007) (0.2719) (0.3297) (0.2651) (0.2791) (0.3111) (0.2930) 
(D/K)
2
 -0.0323*** -0.0332*** -0.0295*** -0.0250*** -0.0132* -0.0109 -0.0013 
 
(0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0105) (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0068) (0.0118) 
Size -0.0451 -0.0649 -0.1627 -0.0588 -0.0479 -0.1063 -0.0462 
 
(0.0742) (0.0906) (0.1029) (0.0699) (0.0928) (0.1061) (0.0774) 
S/K 
 
-0.0509*** 
  
-0.0412*** 
  
  
(0.0176) 
  
(0.0156) 
  
TQ 
  
-0.3849* 
  
-0.2574 
 
   
(0.2205) 
  
(0.1720) 
 
FQ 
   
1.2405* 
  
1.4897*** 
    
(0.7056) 
  
(0.4303) 
GFC dum. 
    
-0.9451*** -0.9772*** -1.1226*** 
     
(0.2611) (0.2315) (0.2341) 
Constant 0.2234 0.7045 3.2475 0.6723 0.2209 1.7361 0.2721 
 
(1.6902) (2.0526) (2.3973) (1.5690) (2.1046) (2.5488) (1.7039) 
Obs.  792 792 792 792 792 792 792 
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Table 4: Testing for the FCF hypothesis: full sample. This table reports system-GMM estimates of 
the testing regressions of full sample. For all models, the dependent variable is investment ratio 
(I/K). CF/K stands for Cash ﬂow ratio. We use four methods to classify good investment 
opportunities and bad investment opportunities. Neg. FQ 4 considers minimum four years of 
negative‘fundamental’ Q as poor investment opportunities, Neg. FQ consider only the negative 
‘fundamental’ Q as the representative. FQ12 and FQ 30 use 12% and 30% of the ‘fundamental’ Q 
as the cutting oﬀ points respectively. I(·) is the indicator function equals to unit if the statement 
in the brackets is true and zero otherwise. Each model include the 2008 GFC has a f suﬃx. The 
lags of (I/K) t − 1, (I/K)
2
t − 1 , (S/K) t – 1 and (P/K) t − 1 are used as instruments in the system GMM 
estimation. Sargan test is employed to verify the null hypothesis of joint validity of instruments 
used in system-GMM, Autocorrelation tests are also used to determine the proper number of 
lags taking for the instrument variables. These testing results are not reported but available upon 
request. Standard errors are in brackets and we use * for 10% level of signiﬁcance and ** for 5% 
and *** for 1%.  
  Neg. FQ4 Neg. FQ FQ12 FQ30 
  (5) (5f) (6) (6f) (7) (7f) (8) (8f) 
(I/K)t-1 1.0979** 1.1201*** 1.2259** 1.1908*** 1.2529*** 1.1817*** 1.2857*** 1.2067*** 
 
(0.4812) (0.2972) (0.4964) (0.3371) (0.4462) (0.3184) (0.4787) (0.3317) 
(I/K)t-1
2
 -0.0528** -0.0562*** -0.0584** -0.0585*** -0.0593*** -0.0583*** -0.0603*** -0.0590*** 
 
(0.0220) (0.0150) (0.0227) (0.0169) (0.0206) (0.0159) (0.0223) (0.0167) 
CF/K 0.2154  0.2041  0.0157  0.1246  0.0498  0.1463  0.0154  0.1281  
 
(0.2401) (0.1828) (0.1949) (0.1774) (0.1636) (0.1548) (0.1913) (0.1757) 
FQ 1.4949** 1.7280*** 1.9475*** 2.0723*** 1.8434*** 1.9936*** 1.9263*** 2.0632*** 
 
(0.6150) (0.3205) (0.3214) (0.2427) (0.3099) (0.2329) (0.3187) (0.2469) 
CF/K*I(NFQ4) 0.6613* 0.7528*** 
      
 
(0.3459) (0.2274) 
      
CF/K*I(NFQ) 
  
0.9318*** 0.8152*** 
    
   
(0.2360) (0.1938) 
    
CF/K*I(FQ12) 
   
1.0017*** 0.8529*** 
  
     
(0.1702) (0.1706) 
  
CF/K*I(FQ30) 
     
0.9808*** 0.8263*** 
       
(0.2022) (0.1819) 
CF/K*GFCdum 
 
-1.0152*** 
 
-0.8243*** 
 
-0.8048*** 
 
-0.8307*** 
  
(0.1776) 
 
(0.2427) 
 
(0.2386) 
 
(0.2395) 
(D/K)
2
 -0.0076  0.0067  -0.0160  0.0011  -0.0279*** -0.0033  -0.0265*** -0.0013  
 
(0.0194) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0111) (0.0021) (0.0085) (0.0030) (0.0081) 
Size -0.0706  -0.1243** -0.0963* -0.1318** -0.0891* -0.1260** -0.1062* -0.1338** 
 
(0.0507)  (0.0482)  (0.0550)  (0.0545)  (0.0506)  (0.0538)  (0.0582)  (0.0573)  
Constant 1.2460  2.3916** 1.8593  2.5714** 1.7491  2.5002** 2.0553  2.6075** 
 
(1.1054)  (1.0217)  (1.1732)  (1.1567)  (1.0748)  (1.1334)  (1.2389)  (1.2125)  
Obs. 792  792  792  792  792  792  792  792  
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Table 5: Testing for the FCF hypothesis: in three groups  
This table reports system-GMM estimates of the testing regressions of full sample. For all 
models, the dependent variable is investment ratio (I/K). CF/K stands for Cash ﬂow ratio. We 
classify good investment opportunities and bad investment opportunities according to the 
level of ‘fundamental’ Q into three groups. Group 1 is the lowest, which is labeled as FQ1 and 
group 3 has the best opportunities and labeled as FQ3. Each model include the 2008 GFC has a 
f suﬃx. The lags of (I/K) t − 1, (I/K)
2
t − 1 , (S/K) t − 1 and (P/K) t – 1 are used as instruments in the 
system GMM estimation. Sargan test is employed to verify the null hypothesis of joint validity 
of instruments used in system-GMM, Autocorrelation tests are also used to determine the 
proper number of lags taking for the instrument variables. These testing results are not 
reported but available upon request. Standard errors are in brackets and we use * for 10% 
level of signiﬁcance and ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
  (9) (9f) (10) (10f) 
  Cash flow Positive cash flow 
(I/K)t-1 1.2507*** 1.1761*** 1.1612*** 1.1106*** 
 
(0.4621) (0.3099) (0.3952) (0.2747) 
(I/K)t-1
2
 -0.0590*** -0.0580*** -0.0551*** -0.0551*** 
 
(0.0215) (0.0157) (0.0186) (0.0141) 
FQ 1.7784*** 1.8413*** 1.8019*** 1.8698*** 
 
(0.3117) (0.3152) (0.3046) (0.2879) 
CF/K*FQ1 1.0263*** 0.9958*** 1.0453*** 1.0056*** 
 
(0.0911) (0.0886) (0.0918) (0.0847) 
CF/K*FQ2 -0.1034 -0.0173 -0.0766 -0.0172 
 
(0.2153) (0.0918) (0.1958) (0.1004) 
CF/K*FQ3 0.1252 0.282 0.1292 0.2717 
 
(0.2483) (0.2158) (0.2480) (0.2159) 
CF/K*GFCdum 
 
-0.8568*** 
 
-0.8451*** 
  
(0.2364) 
 
(0.2306) 
(D/K)
2
 -0.0272*** -0.0016 -0.0276*** -0.0022 
 
(0.0034) (0.0078) (0.0036) (0.0074) 
Size -0.1031 -0.1406** -0.0874 -0.1336** 
 
(0.0624) (0.0574) (0.0591) (0.0524) 
Constant 1.9822 2.7546** 1.6596 2.6133** 
 
(1.3421) (1.2074) (1.2811) (1.1122) 
Obs. 792.00  792.00  792.00  792.00  
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Table 6: Testing for the FCF hypothesis: Group I  
This table reports system-GMM estimates of the testing regressions of sub-group set I. For all 
models, the dependent variable is investment ratio (I/K). CF/K stands for Cash ﬂow ratio. We 
classify good investment opportunities and bad investment opportunities according to the 
level of ‘fundamental’ Q into three groups. Group 1 is the lowest, which is labeled as FQ1 and 
group 3 has the best opportunities and labeled as FQ3. The sub-samples are separated 
according to size (model 11-12a) and state ownership (model 13-14a). The lags of (I/K) t − 1, 
(I/K)
2
t − 1 , (S/K) t − 1 and (P/K) t − 1 are used as instruments in the system GMM estimation. Sargan 
test is employed to verify the null hypothesis of joint validity of instruments used in 
system-GMM, Autocorrelation tests are also used to determine the proper number of lags 
taking for the instrument variables. These testing results are not reported but available upon 
request. Standard errors are in brackets and we use * for 10% level of signiﬁcance and ** for 5% 
and *** for 1%. 
  Sub-sample (size groups) Sub-sample (ownership groups) 
 
Large size Small size High state share Low state share 
  (11) (11a) (12) (12a) (13) (13a) (14) (14a) 
(I/K)t-1 0.5207*** 0.5566*** 0.8647* 0.8312** 0.1462  0.1493  1.5404*** 1.5176*** 
 
(0.1872) (0.1942) (0.4705) (0.3639) (0.1850) (0.1823) (0.2576) (0.2679) 
(I/K)t-1
2
 -0.0305*** -0.0331*** -0.0417** -0.0435*** -0.0077 -0.0133 -0.0648*** -0.0650*** 
 
(0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0189) (0.0150) (0.0189) (0.0214) (0.0164) (0.0162) 
CF/K 0.4114** 
 
0.7478*** 
 
0.2269 
  
0.8160*** 
 
(0.1724) 
 
(0.1980) 
 
(0.1929) 
  
(0.2245) 
FQ 0.8185* 0.7590  0.4799  1.0452*** 1.3897** 1.1069** 1.7923*** 1.6387*** 
 
(0.4738) (0.4743) (0.3835) (0.3448) (0.5843) (0.4947) (0.5503) (0.5599) 
CF/K*FQ1 
 
0.3392  
 
1.1732*** 
 
-0.1814 
 
0.9149*** 
  
(0.2888) 
 
(0.1149) 
 
(0.1505) 
 
(0.2382) 
CF/K*FQ2 
 
0.2886  
 
-0.1444 
 
0.6805  
 
0.2450  
  
(0.4751) 
 
(0.6139) 
 
(0.5607) 
 
(0.5283) 
CF/K*FQ3 
 
0.4440*** 
 
-0.1022 
 
0.3652** 
 
0.8384** 
  
(0.1381) 
 
(0.1248) 
 
(0.1620) 
 
(0.3209) 
(D/K)
2
 0.0056 0.0046 -0.0184*** -0.0326*** 0.0211 0.038 -0.0246*** -0.0268*** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0098) (0.0067) (0.0033) (0.0461) (0.0276) (0.0077) (0.0078) 
Size -0.0853 -0.1069 -0.3289* -0.2839 -0.0558 -0.0345 0.107 0.1231 
 
(0.0696) (0.0906) (0.1814) (0.1701) (0.0507) (0.0349) (0.1105) (0.1125) 
Constant 1.8504 2.3366 6.4758* 5.9026* 1.2372 0.6407 -3.1505 -3.376 
 
(1.5720) (2.0282) (3.7457) (3.5094) (1.0412) (0.8662) (2.4622) (2.5063) 
Obs. 392 392 400 400 392 392 400 400 
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Table 7: Testing for the FCF hypothesis: Group II  
This table reports system-GMM estimates of the testing regressions of sub-group set II. For all 
models, the dependent variable is investment ratio (I/K). CF/K stands for Cash ﬂnv ratio. We 
classify good investment opportunities and bad investment opportunities according to the 
level of ‘fundamental’ Q into three groups. Group 1 is the lowest, which is labeled as FQ1 and 
group 3 has the best opportunities and labeled as FQ3. The sub-samples are separated 
according to manager share holding (MANHLD, model 15-16a) and institution share holdings 
(INSHLD, model 17-18a). The lags of (I/K) t − 1 , (I/K)
2
t − 1 , (S/K) t − 1 and (P/K) t − 1 are used as 
instruments in the system GMM estimation. Sargan test is employed to verify the null 
hypothesis of joint validity of instruments used in system-GMM, Autocorrelation tests are also 
used to determine the proper number of lags taking for the instrument variables. These testing 
results are not reported but available upon request. Standard errors are in brackets and we use 
* for 10% level of signiﬁcance and ** for 5% and *** for 1%. 
  Sub-sample (ownership groups II) Sub-sample (ownership groups III) 
 
High MANHLD Low MANHLD High INSHLD Low INSHLD 
  (15) (15a) (16) (16a) (17) (17a) (18) (18a) 
(I/K)t-1 0.0477  0.0430  1.5002*** 1.5659*** 1.0916* 1.1288*** 0.8787** 0.6641* 
 
(0.1896) (0.1876) (0.3928) (0.3350) (0.5681) (0.4136) (0.4059) (0.3888) 
(I/K)t-1
2
 0.0197 0.0206 -0.0670*** -0.0706*** -0.0472* -0.0536*** -0.0446* -0.0341 
 
(0.0352) (0.0370) (0.0183) (0.0159) (0.0259) (0.0183) (0.0253) (0.0245) 
CF/K 0.3703* 
 
0.7240*** 
 
0.5275*** 
 
0.1593  
 
 
(0.1984) 
 
(0.1828) 
 
(0.1573) 
 
(0.1392) 
 
FQ 0.7222** 0.7627* 1.5250** 1.6499*** 1.8364*** 2.0603*** 1.7456*** 1.0632*** 
 
-0.3118 -0.4367 -0.5815 -0.4779 -0.5911 -0.4768 -0.2526 -0.2946 
CF/K*FQ1 
 
0.4563 
 
0.7810*** 
 
0.9567*** 
 
0.0317 
  
(0.6347) 
 
(0.2678) 
 
(0.1139) 
 
(0.0710) 
CF/K*FQ2 
 
0.4485  
 
0.7233  
 
0.0316  
 
0.2946  
  
(0.4901) 
 
(0.8683) 
 
(0.8353) 
 
(0.3295) 
CF/K*FQ3 
 
0.3494 
 
0.6188 
 
-0.6547 
 
0.5541** 
  
(0.2563) 
 
(0.4160) 
 
(0.5606) 
 
(0.2353) 
(D/K)
2
 0.0042 0.0031 -0.0187*** -0.0207** -0.0138** -0.0252*** 0.0068 0.0126 
 
(0.0276) (0.0325) (0.0056) (0.0078) (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0183) (0.0201) 
Size -0.0325 -0.0298 -0.0222 -0.0195 -0.0915 -0.0062 -0.1003 -0.0607 
 
(0.0647) (0.0641) (0.0734) (0.0676) (0.0742) (0.0428) (0.0726) (0.0734) 
Constant 0.62 0.546 -0.1326 -0.1905 1.621 -0.0115 2.0606 1.1841 
 
(1.3877) (1.3869) (1.6990) (1.6007) (1.5211) (1.0146) (1.5088) (1.5062) 
Obs. 392 392 400 400 392 392 400 400 
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Figure 1: Cash flows in energy firms and others (Source: authors’ own calculation 
from RESSET database. The unit in panel (a) is billions RMB and panel (b) is 
percentage.) 
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Highlights 
 
• We test whether the Chinese energy firms tend to misallocate resources due to 
growing free cash flows.  
• A dynamic panel model for the period 2001-2012 for the Chinese energy-related 
public listed firms is employed. 
• We find evidence supporting the free cash flow hypothesis, suggesting 
over-investment problems in the Chinese energy sector. 
•  Firm size and corporate governance structure are important determinants of the 
Chinese energy firms’ investment decisions. 
 
